The price game

When Ron Johnson took over as CEO of J. C. Penney, one of his most sweeping changes was to move away from the constant sales and coupons to a more straightforward pricing model. Not surprising considering he came from Apple where they hold one sale a year, on Black Friday, and not even a great one at that.​

But J. C. Penney is not Apple, and the price game each is playing is different.

Mr. Johnson explained a similar logic when he moved the chain toward simplified pricing. In January 2012, while introducing his new plan to investors, the press and vendors, Mr. Johnson said that in the previous year, the company held 590 sales events; almost three-quarters of the stuff it sold was marked down 50 percent or more.

But here’s the thing: customers weren’t actually paying less. The chain just kept raising the prices that customers saw on the racks, and then discounted those prices during promotions. Why keep playing a game that is expensive and troublesome for the seller and a mirage for the consumer?

J. C. Penney was not the first retailer to be astonished by the brilliance of this realization. In 2006, Macy’s had a similar idea after acquiring the coupon-happy May department stores. It decided to “retrain” those customers, as its chief financial officer put it at the time, by drastically cutting coupons. By 2007, it had abandoned that strategy. Its chief executive acknowledged that pulling back on coupons was Macy’s biggest mistake in its acquisition.

Even Walmart, which actually does pull off the trick of “everyday low prices” in its domestic stores, is finding it hard to convert consumers to a single-price model in countries like Brazil and China, where retailers give deep discounts on a few main products, then mark up the rest, said Mark Wiltamuth, an analyst at Morgan Stanley.

The problem, economists and marketing experts say, is that consumers are conditioned to wait for deals and sales, partly because they do not have a good sense of how much an item should be worth to them and need cues to figure that out.

Just having a generically fair or low price, as Penney did, said Alexander Chernev, a marketing professor at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, assumes that consumers have some context for how much items should cost. But they don’t.

Price strategy has to be supported throughout the organization. For Apple to have one price for its items means they must enforce that price through all of its distribution partners, and it must also create advertising that reinforces the premium quality of the goods. And of course, the products must be good enough to justify a no discount policy.​

​One thing is for certain: once you go sale, it's tough to go back (once you go red, it's hard to go black?). Companies that consider a sale or discount strategy should do so carefully. Once customers expect a regular cadence of sales or discounts (e.g. Restoration Hardware's bi-annual bath sales, or Bed Bath and Beyond's ubiquitous 20% off coupons) they orient their entire behavior around that pattern and won't easily be persuaded to buy at full price ever again.

Ethical nudging

The survey data captures what people think — but not how they act. From research that I've done, the same tendency exists in other facets of our lives. When confronted with the opportunity to cheat, most people engage in behavior that violates their own ethical goals.

Fortunately, simple interventions can help. For instance, consider a study that my colleagues and I conducted a few years ago [PDF] in collaboration with a major U.S. car insurance company. As part of the study, we sent 13,488 of the company's customers a form that asked them to report the number of miles they had driven the prior year, as indicated on their cars' odometers. Cheating by under-reporting mileage would come with the financial benefit of lower insurance premiums.

On about half of the forms sent out, customers were supposed to sign to indicate their truthfulness at the bottom of the form. The other half of the forms asked the customers to sign at the top of the form. The average mileage reported by customers who signed the form at the top was more than 2,400 miles higher than that reported by customers who signed at the bottom of the form.

​From Francesca Gino. Mental context is very powerful, and messages transmit more easily when people are in the right mode to receive  them.

Ken Brennan, PI

Mark Bowden wrote of real life private investigator Ken Brennan in Vanity Fair in December of 2010. The story was titled "The Case of the Vanishing Blonde":

After a woman living in a hotel in Florida was raped, viciously beaten, and left for dead near the Everglades in 2005, the police investigation quickly went cold. But when the victim sued the Airport Regency, the hotel’s private detective, Ken Brennan, became obsessed with the case: how had the 21-year-old blonde disappeared from her room, unseen by security cameras? The author follows Brennan’s trail as the P.I. worked a chilling hunch that would lead him to other states, other crimes, and a man nobody else suspected.

Now Bowden has written about Brennan again in "The Body in Room 348"​:

The hotel was just off the cloverleaf outside Beaumont. His company rented him a room in the “cabana,” a three-story wing that wrapped around a small swimming pool framed by potted palms.

That Wednesday night, watching his movie, Greg got an e-mail from his wife, Susie, shortly after seven. Susie was using a computer program to file for a tax extension. After she reported her progress he wrote back, “You’re doin’ good, babe.”

At some point during the loud, computer-generated showdown at the end of the film, amid all the fake violence, Greg was struck from nowhere with a very real and shattering blow. A blow so violent it would blind a man with pain. He managed to get off the bed and move toward the door before he fell, legs splayed and face-first.

He was probably dead by the time his face hit the green rug.

This is some amazing detective work, and it happened in real life. How long before we have a new TV show based on the exploits of Brennan? These are far more compelling stories than the "mysteries of the week" scripts of so many forensic TV shows.

The Oligopoly Problem

I wrote about oligopoly power in the telecom and cable TV industry back in January. The issue is not any one particular way they price gouge you but the structure of the sector as a whole. As an oligopoly all the firms involved can really choose to gouge you any number of ways, you don't have any other options.

Tim Wu's latest post at the New Yorker suggests a potential regulatory solution:

The rise of the American oligopoly makes it an important time to reëxamine how antitrust enforcers and regulators think about concentrated industries. Here’s a simple proposal: when members of a concentrated industry act in parallel, their conduct should be treated like that of a hypothetical monopoly. Of course, that doesn’t make anything necessarily illegal, but abusive or anticompetitive conduct shouldn’t get a free pass just because there are three companies involved instead of one.

Some interests more special than others

Some of the senators who voted against the background-check amendments have met with grieving parents whose children were murdered at Sandy Hook, in Newtown. Some of the senators who voted no have also looked into my eyes as I talked about my experience being shot in the head at point-blank range in suburban Tucson two years ago, and expressed sympathy for the 18 other people shot besides me, 6 of whom died. These senators have heard from their constituents — who polls show overwhelmingly favored expanding background checks. And still these senators decided to do nothing. Shame on them.

I watch TV and read the papers like everyone else. We know what we’re going to hear: vague platitudes like “tough vote” and “complicated issue.” I was elected six times to represent southern Arizona, in the State Legislature and then in Congress. I know what a complicated issue is; I know what it feels like to take a tough vote. This was neither. These senators made their decision based on political fear and on cold calculations about the money of special interests like the National Rifle Association, which in the last election cycle spent around $25 million on contributions, lobbying and outside spending.

Gabrielle Giffords on the Senate's failure to pass any of the three gun control legislation measures today. When something like the Toomey-Manchin bill which would extend background checks and which 90 percent of the country supports gets rejected by the Senate, it's clear who the Senate represents. It's not the majority.

You can peruse the list of Senators who voted for and against the measure. All but four Republicans voted against the measure, and four Democrats defected and voted against the measure.

Even if the Senate had passed the measure, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives would have ended its hopes.​

If there is any consolation in this effort, it's that the Senators who voted against the measure were acting not as representatives of the people but as self-interested politicians. It means that there is a clear path to defeating the NRA: deliver more money and more votes.

Obama summed up the situation clearly:​

They are better organized, they are better financed, they’ve been at it longer and they make sure to stay focused on this one issue during election time. That’s the reason why you can have something that 90 percent of Americans support and you can't get it through the Senate or the House of Representatives.

Your Senator will represent you, but it's going to cost you.​